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Laughter as a Critical Tool for Liberation
Jay Nelson
University of Texas, Dallas

The question of what society is and how it operates is one that has been analyzed
extensively in continental philosophy. In these analyses, the actions of the individual are taken as
products of the society. This frames the question of the quality of life of the individual in a
specific social context that restricts the possibility of critiques of the individual and their
ideological values within a broader critique of society. In other words, these thinkers endeavor to
improve the society by means of criticizing the practices of the social body instead of the
ideology of the individual. Gilles Deleuze, Simone Weil, and Herbert Marcuse together provide
us the tools to conduct an analysis of society in which the society and individual are viewed as
within a symbiotic relationship. In Pure Immanence, Deleuze details an interpretation of
Nietzsche’s will to power and criticizes how it had previously only been interpreted as
domineering rather than life-affirming. It is through this critique that Deleuze allows for the
possibility of a structural political analysis of social power as life-affirming rather than lifedenying. To approach an analysis of this critique, we must try to integrate a new understanding
of force and power that Deleuze offers with prior social structural criticisms while including its
individual component. This is why Simone Weil’s analysis of force in The Iliad or the Poem of
Force is a very fruitful addition to the literature on power and force. Because of her emphasis on
what the individual can do in the face of overwhelming force as she describes it, she also chooses
to discuss it in a context in which a systemic analysis of force is still possible. These particular
characteristics of Weil’s analysis of force allows us to use her work as an intermediary between
Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s power and Marcuse’s work in The One-Dimensional
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Man. Marcuse characterizes society as one which is subtly totalitarian through its illusion of free
choice in the capitalist framework of western society. He views this system as one which reduces
human life down to one dimension in both how we operate within our society and in how we
value things. This idea of one-dimensionality fits very well with Weil’s concept of force and
seems like the inevitable product of a society that has a life denying understanding of power.
This returns us to the question: Is a society with a positive relationship between power and life
possible? John Lippett’s work on laughter combined with this life-affirming understanding of
Force indicates to us that a life-affirming society is only possible through a return to a critical
mode of laughter.
Due to Deleuze’s masterful writing and his own unique philosophical perspective, it is
difficult to differentiate his explanations of the thinkers he is writing about versus his own
thoughts. In fact, in several instances he does both simultaneously. Despite the fact that the work
that is being referenced is an explanation of Nietzsche’s ideas, I am going to refer to the ideas
from the section about Nietzsche from Pure Immanence as if they come solely from Deleuze
unless differentiation seems appropriate in specific instances.
For Deleuze, to be life-affirming is fundamentally oriented around unity between life and
thought. “Life activates thought, and in turn thought affirms life” (Pure Immanence, 66).
Thought and philosophy must be responsive to and affirmative of life. The creation of
metaphysics birthed a disjunction in this unity by forcing thought to deny life by judging it
against ‘higher values’. This leads to philosophy and thought being reactive rather than active
which is the context that allows us to make sense of the will to power as domination. It is
through this reaction that the interpretation of phenomena and the creation of meaning lead to a
reactive relationship of forces. This places coercion as the primary force in the relationship of
forces that composes the will while adaptation and regulation become secondary forces. This is
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how the understanding of the will to power as domination came about that places reaction over
action. It is what we now intuitively conceive of when thinking of force or power. Deleuze wants
a return to this presocratic life-affirming way of thinking to change how we think of the will to
power which should be oriented around creation of values through the action-thought unity.
It is with this life-affirming understanding of force in mind that we must now turn to
Weil’s work on Force and attempt to adapt it to fit this creative mode of being. She characterizes
Force very generally as “that x that turns anybody subjected to it into a thing…[which] turns man
into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him.” (Weil, 163). The example of
Force in action she chooses is the epic poem The Iliad by Homer, because it is incredibly honest
in its characterization of Force in that it never shies away from showing the reader Force in its
incredible brutality. One particular moment that Weil draws our attention to shows that Force, as
she describes at its most extreme, lethal force, is in fact not its most insidious form. Rather,
Force as the potential of enacting death is far more damaging to an individual because it turns the
body into a thing and entombs the mind/soul/spirit in the thingified body. Weil posits that the
mere threat of Force is sufficient to turn man into a thing, “[a] man stands disarmed and naked
with a weapon pointing at him; this person becomes a corpse before anybody or anything
touches him” (Weil, 165). This is the way that we see force at its smallest level which is lifedenying, in how it literally is tied to lethality. In addition to this it subjugates thought into a
reactive role by coercing all those participating in it to reject thought that has the possibility to
affirm their life. This is why Weil is so insistent that the solution to Force is short pauses of
reflection; just small moments in which thought can affirm life. However, because these pauses
can only occur momentarily, the reflection they enable one to have is consumed with the weight
of the experience of violent actions rather than true life-affirming thought in the Deleuzian sense.
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Beyond this smallest level of Force on an individual, there is also significance to the
central conflict of The Illiad being a war, which is a manmade product of the structures and
institutions of society. This shows how Force is not just a natural phenomenon, but rather is
something that is produced and perpetuated by specific structural interactions. In her review of
James Holoka’s new edition of The Illiad or The Poem of Force, Sheila Murnaghan mentions the
context in which it was written, “The Iliad, or The Poem of Force was written in the summer and
fall of 1940, after the fall of France. It may thus be read as an indirect commentary on that tragic
event, which signalized the triumph of the most extreme modern expression of force.”
(Murnaghan, 1). This context only adds to how we can understand Force through its extreme
expression in the military expansion of Nazi Germany. The Nazis in particular were influenced
by an incomplete interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power as one of domination. This lifedenying will to power of domination is the quintessence of Weil’s force which is not just a
phenomenon but a specific political and structural context that perpetuates itself through
individual actors. This is why reflective pauses can only ever be discrete moments in the face of
all-powerful systems.
At this point, Marcuse’s work in The One-Dimensional Man fits nicely with this
connection between life-denying thought and Force on both individual and systemic levels.
Marcuse describes how the process of alienation and capitalist ideology has advanced so much as
to now fully encompass the individual even to the point of removing the inner freedom that one
experiences as a psychological subject though the psychoanalytic process of introjection. This
appears to be another version of the phenomenon Weil described in slaves, that the threat of
death reduces the scope of what the slave can experience down to the forced affection a slave
must exhibit for their master. “To lose more than the slave does is impossible, for he loses his
whole inner life. A fragment of it he may get back if he sees the hope of the possibility of
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changing his fate, but this is his only hope.” (Weil, 170) The quote above shows the
diminishment of the inner life and freedom of the slave. In addition, Marcuse would say that a
part of this introjection is the capitalist ideology and the immediate identification of the self with
the industrialized civilization of our society. This identification removes opposition to the norms
and practices of society which leads to,
...The loss of this [inner] dimension, in which the power of negative thinking... is at
home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material process in which advanced
industrial society silences and reconciles the opposition. (Marcuse, 11).
This death of the power of negative thinking is the most absolute version of the dominance of
life-denying thought. For, it is in this death that the ability to critique present values is lost and
thus the ability to create new values is as well. Deleuze mentions the three metamorphoses from
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: the Camel, Lion, and Child. The Camel represents the
mode of life in which we merely bear the values of our present society. The Lion represents the
stage when we begin to critique and destroy the values imposed on us. And, the Child is the stage
in which the life-affirming practice of creating our own values takes place. Marcuse describes
perfectly how the present ideological values of our society are no longer able to be critiqued
which prevents the possibility of life activating thought and thought, in turn, affirming life. It is
due to the limitation of Force that we are not able to transition from the Camel to the Lion. This
is the final stage of Force: it has not just turned our bodies into things, but our souls as well.
There is no longer even the possibility of a life-affirming philosophy in our society anymore.
It is at this point that we must again consider how we might escape this predicament. It is
such a totalizing problem that we are unable to grasp a full picture of what it might tangibly
mean to live in a life-affirming society. This imaginative difficulty forces us to look to different
types of solutions within our social framework. It is here that we must turn to John Lippitt’s
work on laughter in a Nietzschean context. He says:
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Zarathustra's praise of laughter in his speech to the higher men is ecstatic. He urges them
to 'learn to laugh at yourselves as a man ought to laugh!'24 Contrasting himself with
Jesus, who in Luke 6:25 wishes 'woe to you who laugh now'. (“Nietzsche, Zarathustra
and the Status of Laughter”, 43)
Lippitt goes on to say,
Laughing lions, then, are what the higher men have to become in order to embrace the
eternal recurrence and laugh the laughter of the height. It is only when they do this, which
they indeed eventually do in an affirmation almost as ecstatic as Zarathustra's own, that
they realize their freedom… (“Nietzsche, Zarathustra and the Status of Laughter”, 43).
Lippitt here connects the idea behind Nietzsche’s character of Zarathustra, that of the Lion and
Child, with a very tangible practice of rejection of the life-denying attitude of Jesus from the
book of Luke. This second section from Lippitt almost comes out of Deleuze himself here:
“Eternal Return is not only selective thinking but also selective Being. Only affirmation comes
back, only what can be affirmed comes back, only joy returns.” (Deleuze, 88). Laughter itself is
the mechanism to return to a life-affirming philosophy and thus a life-affirming society. It is
through Laughter that we as people locked in the stage of the Camel can begin to shift to the
Lion which reintroduces the critical power of negative thinking that Marcuse thought was lost.
Laughter has been thought of for centuries as a force itself because it has been able to subvert the
dominating power structures of societies. It gives power to those who have none through its
critical faculty. It is itself a mode of freedom and becoming through these affirmative critical
qualities. In another work, Lippitt pointed out the almost religious role of Laughter for this same
reason, “It is the redemptive potential of laughter as an attitude towards ourselves and our world
that leads Nietzsche to condemn those who forbid us to laugh at ourselves, them, and human
existence. Note, therefore, that laughter is assigned a quasi-religious role” (“Existential
Laughter”, 2). Thus, it forges a way towards a new kind of society which is almost inconceivable
to us. In truth, it is difficult to even use the word “society” for what would require such a radical
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shift. Because our modern notion of society requires such social limitation, it even tries to
exercise force over the conditions of Laughter. Laughter has been commodified primarily
through the comic industry, which perverts its critical power into a passive experience. Thus in a
similar way that Weil and the critical theorists propose their modest solutions to cope with the
overwhelming force of their problems, I propose that we must take laughter seriously as a critical
mode of being and as a mode of political expression.
This raises the question: if Laughter can be commodified and integrated within this
oppressive system of force, then how can it be liberatory? The answer requires us to first define
what we mean by Laughter. Laughter as a phenomenon, is necessarily tied to what gave rise to it.
It is a responsive action. We have already seen previously that the phenomenon of laughter can
be commodified so, naturally, we are not talking about the phenomenon of laughter alone. What
we are discussing is the character and interpretation of the action that gives rise to laughter or put
simply: a joke or comedic situation. However, the purpose here is to use laughter as a critical
activity, thus we cannot just simply say a ‘joke’ because that would invoke the social values that
form the concept of ‘joke’ which we are attempting to criticize. In order to critically use laughter,
we must take as its object the values that society is attempting to impose upon us. This new
critical type of Laughter takes on an almost obscene character from the perspective of the values
it criticizes because these introjected social values effect our judgements of it. Thus, we, as
influenced subjects, are tasked with the creation of a product that we have to learn to appreciate.
It is very important to note that in this critical Laughter is the rejection of particular types of
values, life-denying values. Thus, laughter must reject any ‘guidance’ or direction from these
life-denying values of our society in order for it to be possible to critique them. In other words,
Laughter cannot only be obscene, it must also be totally holistic. It is here that a reference to
Camus appears appropriate to mention as this holistic critical Laughter appears much like his
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description of the rebellion against the Absurd. Both are a rejection of systems of meaning or
value placed upon us by others. Laughter becomes a method to reject the values of society that
have been impressed upon us as well as a method to embrace the arbitrary existential situation
we find ourselves within. Thus, while Laughter in this sense fits within the Camusian
framework. Its goal is to advance beyond rebellion against the Absurd into a more
Nietzschean/Deleuzian sense of life-affirmation.
Weil and Marcuse when read together are almost obviously in agreement and few would
take issue with their pairing. However, the introduction of Deleuze to the pair totally shifts the
emphasis of the critique and truly propels the force and severity of their arguments. Orienting
ourselves towards the goal of a life-affirming philosophy raises the stakes of the discussion
because the mechanisms that trap us in the immanence of a life-denying mode of thought operate
on a far deeper and more insidious level than the structural mechanisms of a capitalist society. In
this analysis, however, we see clearly that there is a path to unity between action and thought
through the practice of serious critical Laughter. This Laughter is a method by which we can
reintroduce critical capacities that these aforementioned structural mechanisms have removed
from us. This then allows us to question the life-denying values impressed upon us by our
society. It is through this critical mode of Laughter that we can begin to create our own lifeaffirming values and restore the unity between life and thought.
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